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Abshuct-e of the aims of providing 'security of data' in e- 
commerce transactions is maldng sure that the receiver receives 
the same data which the sender sends, that is the data has not been 
taipered in any way. To achieve this aim digitd signatures are 
used. A digital signature helps in providing integrity, message 
authentication, and signer authentication for the signed data. An 
XML signature can contain or point to the data that is being 
signed. In th is  paper we discuss a possible solution of avoiding a 
signature from breaking when there is B change in the location of 
the document after it has been signed. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As XML is becoming the de facto standard for c o m u -  
nication of data over the Internet, the need for security of 
the data should not be left behind. In fact with out security 
the whole purpose of achieving data exchange will have no 
value as there will be no guarantee about the origin and the 
integrity of the data. Digital security has always been about 
the compromise between convenience and peace of mind 
(11. This holds true for XML also. Different approaches 
have been proposed that address the problem of protecting 
information in a Web system. However, these approaches 
typically operate at the file-system level, independently of 
the data that have to be protected from unauthorized ac- 
cesses. A lot of study is being done at proving security at 
the element level [2,3,4]. 
The two main issues that need to be addressed are: 
Restricting the access to an XML service only to 
authorized users. 
Maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of the in- 
formation exchanged. 
For this signatures are used. It provides integrity, mes- 
sage authentication, and signer authentication for data that 
is being included by the signature. A signature helps in 
keeping the data secure and helps in checking its integriv. 
The sender computes a hash value of the data which is to be 
signed and signs it with hidher private key and includes it 
in the signature. The receiver authenticates the signature 
and decrypts the hash value with the sender's public key. It 
then creates its own hash value of the data and checks it 
with the hash value that came along with the signature. If 
they both match then the integrity of the document is as- 
sured [ 5 ] .  If any changes are made to the document after 
the sender signs the document then the hash value com- 
puted at either ends doesn't match and the signature is said 
io be broken i.e. the integrity of the message is not guaran- 
teed 
11. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
An XML signature can contain or point to the data that 
is being signed and thus it relies on any source available via 
a URI in the digital signature. But consider a change in the 
URI location of the data. How will this affect the signature? 
We will consider a scenario where the signature that is 
created points to the data through the Reference URI which 
has an id "change". Suppose we know that the location 
where the data is contained is going to change h m  
htlp://www.chan~e.com/old.xml to 
h t ~ : / ~ . c h a n r r e . c ~ ~ n a u . x m l  after the signature has 
been created, but the data signed at the original location is 
going to remain the same. Then when the signature is being 
verified, the computed hash value at the receiver's end will 
not match with the hash value which was sent by the sender 
due of the change in the URI location and thus the signa- 
ture might break. Sa our problem is how can we create an 
XML signature that enables the vaiidity of the signature not 
to break even in the change of the source location when the 
document signed is going to remain constant? 
In. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The signature is a collection of a number of elements ac- 
cording to a schema and each element has its own cardinal- 
ity. Cardinality specifies the number of occurrence of each 
element in the signature. An approach to solve the above 
problem is to utilize such an optional element of the XML 
Signature, the Manifest element. The use of the Manifest 
element enables the application to reserve the reference 
validation semantics for itself[6]. 
We will discuss about the Manifest element, the process 
of Signature generation (core generation) and Signature 
authentication or validation (core validation), and the steps 
needed to achieve the solution for the above problem in the 
next sections. Core generation and core validation process 
are discussed as it is necessary to know how the signature 
is created, after the changes are made by using the Manifest 
element. 
IV. THE ~!"FESTELEMENT 
The Manifest element is used to provide additional 
requirements, which are not directly addressed by the basic 
structure of the X M L  signature specification. The Manifest 
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element, like the SignedInfo element is a collection of Ref- 
erence elements. But the difference lies between the levels 
of importance of the Reference element each of them con- 
tain. The Sigaedlnfo is an important element in the Signa- 
ture specification as it contains the Reference element that’s 
points to the data being signed, the digest value computed 
and other elements. The signature algorithm is applied to 
this element and it is verified during the signature verifica- 
tion process [ 61. 
On the contrary the Manifest element too is a collection 
of Reference elements but it itself is a referenced element. 
If it is used, then it i s  referenced by the Reference sub- 
element of the SignedInfo element. Figure 1 shows a Mani- 
fest element “Man” being referenced by the SignedInfo 
element. For simplicity only the structure of the Signature 
has been shown and the details are omitted. 
When the signature verification takes place, only the in- 
tegrity of the Reference elements inside SignedInfo element 
is verified and not of the Reference elements that are inside 
the Manifest element. But the digest over the Manifest itself 
will be checked by the core verification process. Thus the 
validation of the data inside the Manifest element is not 
done by the Signature verification process but is dependent 
on the application. We will be utilizing this feature of the 




<Reference URI=”Mm” > 






< R e f m c e  W=” “b 
<DigestMethord Algorithm=” “I> 
<Digestvalue/> 
</Reference> 




Fig. 1: A Manifest demcnt ‘Man’’ 
v. CORE GENERATION 
Core generation is the process of creating a signature. It 
consists of two steps, Reference Generation and Signature 
Generation [7]. Reference Generation aims at creating the 
Reference element that have all their sub elements like 
lmnsforms, attributes and digest values. There can be more 
than one reference element in a signature. The aim of sig- 
name generation is to create the Signaturevalue element 
and complete the whole Signature element with all the at- 
tributes and elements. 
The steps of Reference Generation are for each 
Reference element is: 
Apply the Transforms (optional) 
Create the Digest value of the resource 
Create and complete the Reference element. 
Create the SignedInfo element by using the Reference 
elements created in Reference Generation. 
Apply the canonicalization algorithm and the signature 
algorithm to the SignedInfo element created. 
Create and complete the Signature element. 
The steps of Signature Generation are: 
In Sigoature Generation the SignecUnfo element is can- 
onicaiized before it is signed. Canonicalkition ensures that 
the same octets are signed and compared with which will 
ensure the signature validity, and it makes sure that seman- 
tically meaningless alterations which may happen as the 
signature is passed through the XML processors of various 
application doesn’t break the signature. 
W. CORE VALIDATION 
Core validation is the process of checking the validity of 
the signature. It is an inverse process of core generation. It 
too is composed of 2 steps, Reference Validation and Sig- 
nature Validation [7]. Reference validation i s  used to check 
wether the data referenced by the Reference element has 
not been altered. Signature validation checks the digest 
value of SignedInfo element with the value stored in Sig- 
naturevalue. 
The steps of Reference Validation for each Reference 
element in Signedhfo are: 
Canonicalize the Signedhfo element and obtain the 
data being pointed by the URI attribute of each 
Reference element 
It is then digested according to the algorithm specified 
in its corresponding DigestMethord Algorithm 
element. 
The digest value computed is now checked with the 
value stored in the Digestvalue element. If they match 
then reference validation is said to pass. 
The steps of Signature Validation for the SignedInfo 
element are: 
Obtain the verification key from the Keyhfo element. 
Witb the signature algorithm compute the signature 
value over the canonicalized SignedInfo element and com- 
pare it with the value inside the Signaturevalue element. If 
they match then Signature Validation is said to pass. 
4 
w. UTnrZING TEE MANIFESTELEMENT 
The use of the Manifest element to contain the Refer- 
ence element is a process of defying the steps of core vali- 
dation [6]. Each Reference element which anticipates a 
change in location must be placed in the Manifest element, 
which is referenced by the Reference element of the Signe- 
MO element as shown in figure 2. For simplicity the 
other elements of SignedInfo elements are omitted. 
In order to achieve a solution by using the Manifest ele- 
ment, we have include the data that is going to change its 
location in the Manifest element and make some changes 
prior to executing the steps of core generation and core 
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a e f e r e n c e  
................ 
</SignedInfo> 




4IigestMethord Algorithm=’’ ... .”b 
<DigestVaIu e... ...  </Digestvalue> 
</Reference> 
m a n i f e s u  
dObjec0 
<Signaturevalue>. . .dSignatureValue> 
<KeyInfo>. ......... -4KeyInfe 
dSignature> 
Fig. 2: SignedIrtfo etcment 
Our aim is to create a transformation which finds the de- 
sired URI amiute  with the particular id in the Reference 
sub-element of the Manifest element, and leave it out of the 
final data before the digest of the message is created i.e. 
before the steps of core generation are executed. So that the 
change in the URI location will have no effect during core 








<DigestMethordAlgorithm=”. ..... b 
Fig. 3: ‘‘Manifest“ Element before 
The XSLT transform have to be created in such a way 
so that the <Manifest> element changes from as shown in 
figure 3 to the one shown in figure 4. 
Once the transformation is done, the URI is omitted 
h m  being a part of the digest value, The process of core 
generation is done and the signature is created. Core vali- 
dation passes as the URI is not included h m  being a part 
of the digest value, and as a result of that the Signature- 
Value remains the same at both ends and is impervious to 
changes in the location of the URI. Thus by applying the 
transformation and omitting the URI. location of the docu- 
ment which is going to change, from being a part of the di- 
gest value, we are allowing the document to change its lo- 









Fig. 4: “Manifesf‘ Element after 
In the core generation & validation process only the 
Reference elements that are inside the SignedInfo element 
are de-referenced, digested and validated, so the internal 
processing and validation of the Manifest element has to be 
application specific. The Manifest element enables the ap- 
plication to reserve the reference validation semantics for 
itself Thus the signature that is created no longer guaran- 
tees the location that is contained by the Reference element 
of the Manifest element and it is the responsibility of the 
application to verify the validity of that data when the core 
validation process is being done. 
W I .  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we discuss a possible solution of avoiding a 
signature  om breaking when there is a change in the loa- 
tion of the document. Each URI which anticipates a change 
in its location must be placed in the <ManifesP element 
which enables the application to reserve the reference vali- 
dation semantics for itself. We utilize this element to con- 
tain the data whose location is going to change and apply 
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Aklmct-The objective of this work is to develop a platform 
supporting the secure and quick deployment of distributed medi- 
cal applications creating a0 environment and associated tools for 
the usage of medical personnel in their interaction with patients. 
We adopted the Electronic Health Record (EHR) Architecture 
Btueprint as developed by Canada Health Lnfoway [l], which pro- 
poses Web service technology as m integration platform. We de- 
veloped this environment for distributed and collaborative use by 
selected medical personnel using the combination of communica- 
tion networks such as the Ca*net 4, ORION, NETERAnet and 
NClT*net. This intelligent platform will enable the mining, re 
trieval, modification, management, and synchronization of various 
databases used by doctors in handling data in regards to patients 
and their illnesses, and last but not least, will examine and provide 
the securityrequirements associated withweb services in the 
context of +Health applications. 
Keyword- e-Health; scalable, secure web-services; data 
mining, monitoring and management; privacy aud security of the 
electronic health information 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Health Care, there are many enterphe-oriented ap- 
plications that have been used within a closed "circle-of- 
care''. It has been widely recoguized that an integration of 
these applications into a network-centric h e w o r k  would 
likely result in significant service improvements and cost 
reductions [2]. 
A major challenge in this context is to develop scalable, 
secure web based services where the security and privacy 
M e w o r k  is meant for the access to and the protection of 
sensitive information as it travels across the boundaries of 
individual organisations, in compliance with the Privacy of 
Information Act [3]. In this regard, e-heaIth is one of the 
major blocks of the Secure Channel of the Canadian e- 
Government fiamework [4]. 
The backbone of our work is the secure web-data ma- 
nipulation by medical specialists, while deaIing with pa- 
tients affected by diseases calling for a highly specialized 
knowledge and expextise. In this context a platform able to 
interact with a plethora of databases and other forms of in- 
formation storage and retrieval methods is a must. The in- 
teraction of doctors with the information has to be secured 
through encryption and through a complex process of 
authentication and authorization. Some of the required se- 
curity technologies have already been developed for other 
industries, e.g., in the area of electronic commerce. 
Other technologies such as patient-consent dependent 
role-based access control and person-oriented audit trails 
are not ready available to date. 
11. SYSTEM hCI3ITECCUR.E 
Figure 1 illustrates the system components, which will 
be described in the sequel. 
t 
Fig.1 Conceptual architectwe 
A. Authorizarion & Access Manager @AIL@ using a Data 
Mning, Monitoring and Management Platform @%IMF) 
The AAM uses the Certificate manager (CM) and the 
Individual Consent Manager (ICM) to control access to in- 
formation content based on personal consent, the role of the 
information-accessing entity, and the type of information 
use, The DMMP component is the ceria control system of 
the data and metadata exploration, migration, unification, 
and management. It is meant to unify different data from 
different types from different databases used by different 
medical units, classifying them, storing the unified data in a 
database and allowing clients to retrieve the information 
with different degrees of flexibility. The platform is intrin- 
sically providing the security inhstructure related to the 
management of authority certificates, the authentication and 
the encryption of data using standardized encryption algo- 
rithms. 
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B. Decision Support System PSS) 
The DSS consists of two parts: 
1) A Knowledge Sub-system 
2) A Diagnostic Sub-system 
The diagnostic Sub-system offers a primary use of per- 
sonal health information for offering consultation while the 
Knowledge sub-system offers a secondary use of health in- 
formation for training. The DSS is an excellmt case study 
for analyzing and developing distributed security and pri- 
vacy mechanisms that match a patient’s given consent to 
the type of infomation use. Results will be applicable to a 
broad range of applications in health care. 
For more details on the DSS, which is built as a dynamic 
service environment, using holonic multi-agent technology, 
please refer to [5 ] .  
C. Patient & Provider Regiiiiy (PPR) 
The PPR is a directory service that contains information 
about patients and health care providers, such as their iden- 
tification number, certification, domain expertise etc. The 
PPR is currently being developed in other projects fhded 
by regional health authorities and the Canada Health 
Infoway. 
D. Individual Consent Manager @CM 
The ICM maintains and serves information about the 
consent given by individuals about the use of their personal 
health information. In addition to a Web service interface to 
be used by other M e w o r k  components, it has a secure 
Web interface to enable individuaIs to review and adjust 
consent information. 
E. Certificale Manager (Cw 
The CM distributes and controls (potentially revokes) 
digitally signed trust certificates (X.509) of providers and 
patients. Trust certificates are essential for establishing 
authenticity as well as providing a basis for encryption 
based on a public key infiastructure (PIU). For DMMP see 
II1.A. 
F. Secure Health Informution Access Lqer  (SHIAL) 
Health Information Access Layer (HIAL) is a term de- 
fined in Canada Health Infoway’s Electronic Health Rec- 
ord (EHRs) Blueprint Architecture. 
The main purpose of this component is to leverage the 
value of existing heterogeneous medical applications and 
integrate them into a networked EHRs. 
The SHIAL has to resolve heterogeneity on two levels, 
namely on the technological leveI and on the semantic 
level. From a technological point of View the HIAL pro- 
vides a standardized way of accessing heterogeneous sys- 
t e m  using Web service technology (SOAP, XML, and 
UDDI etc.). 
From a semantic point of view, HIAL provides a con- 
ceptual mapping of data structures and terminologies used 
in the various heterogeneous medical systems to a standard 
ontology, based on the HL7 Reference Information Model 
In terms of security, SHIAL mediates between trust cre- 
dentials on the inter-organizational network level and those 
trust credentials used within the enterprise. From an inter- 
organizational view, SHIAL security is based on function- 
ality provided by AAM. Since the semantic mapping to 
RIM provides S W  with knowledge about the semantics 
of information accessed by network services, SHIAL can 
provide AAM with meta-data important for deciding 
whether to grant access for a particular use case. 
0- 
G. Audit Trail Manager (ATW 
The ATM manages person-oriented audit trails for per- 
sonal health information exchanged in the EH& network. 
Most currently available audit mechanisms are resource- 
based, rather than person-based. They log access opera- 
tions to specific information resources such as data files, 
database tables, network objects etc. 
In a network-centric architecture integrating many het- 
erogeneous data sources, these mechanisms are too limited 
to provide answers to person-oriented auditing questions, 
such as “Who has accessed what information about me and 
for what purpose?” Person-oriented audit-trails are diffi- 
cult to achieve in heterogeneous environments because in- 
formation content is structured in different ways, and, thus, 
it becomes problematic to distinguish anonymous infor- 
mation content fiom personal information. In our frame- 
work, this semantic heterogeneity problem is solved by the 
SHIAL, which maps heterogeneous concepts used at dif- 
ferent organizations to a common RIM. 
Consequently, the SKtAL will use the ATM to log all 
access to personal information on the network. In addition 
to logging these access patterns, the ATM has a role of re- 
solving synonymous ways of identifymg individuals (such 
as by name, by Personal Health Number - PHN etc.) 
H .  EHR Media Knowledge Base (MKB) 
The availability of high bandwidth networks (such, as 
CA*Net4 [6] enable the use of multimedia and real-time 
collaborative web-services for pattem recopition in diag- 
nostic images. 
We extend the concept of a knowledge base with textual 
data to include diagnostic images and the expert system 
(part of the DSS) will be extended to offer consultation on 
graphical images, generated by the medical machines. 
The MKl3 is based on off-the-shelf components. Diag- 
nostic Imaging repositories are currently being developed 
in projects funded by Infoway and health authorities. 
I. CIinicul EHR System (C-EHR) 
The C-EHR component in our EHRs stands for poten- 
tially many different clinical information systems in Vision 
Care to be integrated in the network-centric h e w o r k .  
For the purpose of this project, we use VFUS (Vision 
Rehabilitation Information System), an in-kind 
contribution made by Jackson Willms Medical Services 
Inc. 
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LII. DATA MINING, MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT 
PLATFORM @m) FOR E-HEALTH PRIVACY 
E”CEMENT 
A. Overview 
The DMMP (Fig. 2), [7]is seen as the control layer of 
the entire system. The key problems to be addressed by the 
DMMP are related to the general architecture of the data 
indexing for unifying diverse data from different doctor’s 
files about the patient history and diagnostic made as well 
as the data exploration, synchronization and reporting. 
These issues are to be investigated in the context of the 
SHIAL architecture. The mapping between SHlAL and 
DMMF has to be devised and implemented as the SHIAL is 
providing functions for the domain data understanding 
while the DMMP is providing the connection between data 
stored in data bases, file systems, emails, web-servers, and 
in general any form of data storing and manipulation. 
Fig.2 Overview of the data mining, monhhg, and management plat- 
form 
The DMMP is capable of exploring and unifying infor- 
mation from any source such as: 
datab&es: Oracle, DB2, MSSQL(Microsoft SQL 
Server) , MySQL, Informix, Lotus and others 
Relational databases; 
Web sites: http and https; iii] File -systems; 
FTP(Fi1e Transfer Protocol) 
e-mails: MAP(Intemet Message Access F’roto- 
col) and Microsoft Exchange; 
JNDI (JAVA NAMING AND DIRECTORY 
INTERFACE); 
SAP 
and it enables the automated categorization of information. 
The destination can be: 
’U I databases: Oracle, DB2, MSSQL(Microsofi SQL 
Server), MySQL, Informix, Lotus and others 
Relational databases; 
h File -systems; 
k FTP(Fi1e Transfer Protocol); 
P DMMF-finder, which offers highly sophisticated 
information retrieval that, is not restricted solely 
to search processes. 
Through DMMP, the infomation can be accessed from 
practically any source. The accessed material is qualified 
and integrated into other applications. A manager of the 
platform (DMMP-manager) allows the administrator of the 
system to manipulate data among different databases by 
simple iconic interactions. The DMMP -manager auto- 
matically weeds out any irrelevant information, inmrpo- 
rating only relevant material in the data flow. The DMMP 
provides for fast, well-founded decision making and effec- 
tive information management. DMMP contahs also tools 
for the manipulation of data and mekdata and thus for 
managing its idhstructure as well. The DMMP manager 
can perform: 
& simple defdtion and adjustment of qualifying 
processes using an iconic p m g ” i n g  Ian- 
w g e ;  
the central control of DMMP-manager compo- 
nents; 
provision for automated categorization of infor- 
mation; 
the optimization of system’s performance 
The DMMP-manager i s  based on the DMMP -fider. 
The D W - f m d e r  allows DMMP-manager to understand 
information, thus adding a quality dimension never seen 
before in information retrieval systems. DMMP -manager 
ensures central access to a host of different data sources. 
With the help of an intelligent agent system (Fig. 2) [SI, 
any changes can be identified and conveyed to the central 
system. This means, users are kept up to speed with the 
latest information at all times. The DMMP is compatible 
with portals and other systems. This degree of intercon- 
nectivity enables it to deliver qualified information ftotn 
one or more data sources to any users or systems within 
the loop. DMMP is transparent to the hardware and the op- 
erating system used. 
The DMMP has a layered architecture (Fig. 3) .  Func- 
tionality in the lower layers is used by the upper layers, 




Fig. 3: DMMP architecture 
9 Data Transfer Layer. Provides uniform interfaces for 
reading and writing to data repositories. AI1 informa- 
tion repositories are uniformly accessed through the 
data transfer layer. 
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Communication Layer. Facilitates communication 
between DMMP modules. 
Security Layer. Handles credentials for accessing sen- 
sitive repository data.Based on roles and permissions 
and authorization tickets it authenticates users and 
authorizes all operations. 
Notification Layer. Monitors the source data reposito- 
ries for new information. The notification layer moni- 
tors the data repositories and when content is created 
or updated, other data management camponents are 
notified. 
Processing Layer. Coordinates the data collecting, 
processing and distribution operations. Data is proc- 
essed through processing scripts, this layer handles 
data translation, mapping and structuring. 
Control Layer. Responsible with the DMMF modules 
administration. Provides a complete management sys- 
tem for data management h e w o r k  components, 
components can be remotely installed, configured and 
managed. 
B. The Security L q e r  
DMMP access is granted ody  to authorized users, which 
can enter the platform only through the DMMP Security 
Layer (Fig. 4). Based on the user credentials, the security 
layer determines the user roles and permissions, and the 
data that can be available for the user. The key security 
concept that lay the foundation of the DMMP functionality 
are: 
Fig. 4: DMMP secufe BCCCSS workflow 
Permissions. A permission specifies the right of per- 
m. Roles represent collections of permissions. 
Authorization Tickets. The authorization ticket represents 
the information used to securely identify the session with 
the client. Based on the authorization ticket that has been 
obtained as a result of the login operation, the client identi- 
fies its session using this authorization ticket. The authori- 
zation ticket carries information related to the user session 
and it is signed with the security module's secret key in or- 
der to avoid malicious usage. The authorization ticket has a 
very short validity period (some minutes) calculated fiom 
the last usage time of the ticket. 
Security Session. Once the client authenticates himself to 
the system a security session is created for him on the secu- 
rity module server side. Each security session has associ- 
ated an authorization ticket, which is passed to the client. 
The authorization ticket is the identifier of the session. The 
forming an operation or accessing a resource. 
security session maintains the security connection context 
for the user that has been authenticated in the system. 
User Securiw Context. Every time a user logs in, a user 
security context is created (if it was not created before - a 
user may login in the system more rimes through different 
modules). There is a connection between the user security 
context and the authorization ticket. The user security con- 
text maintains secure infomation related to the user (user 
credentials, user principal, etc.). 
Authentication Ticket. The authentication ticket repre- 
sents a substitute for the credentials that the users must 
provide to authenticate themselves to the system. 
Heartbeat. When the authorization ticket is not used in 
some security operation for a longer period of time, the cli- 
ent may loose the session. In order to avoid this situation, 
the client may send heartbeat signals to the security layer, 
maintaining the session alive. 
e:* symmetric key based encryption (DES, DESede, Blow- 
fish) 
*3 asymmetric key based encryption (DSA, RSA) 
Sumorted encrwtion algorithms: 
w. SECURE-AUL (HEALTH INFORMATION ACCESS 
LAYER) AND AUDIT TRAIL MANAGER 
"he two previously mentioned key problems to be ad- 
dressed in the SHL4L (Fig. 5), namely resolution of tech- 
nological and respectively semantic heterogeneity, are ad- 
dressed on two separate layers in the conceptual SHIAL 
architecture. 
Figure 5 :  Secure-HIAL Architecture 
The first problem is addressed in the Platform Homog- 
enization Layer, which hosts an extensible plug-in archi- 
tecture of so-called ImpEx Conduits (import/export adapt- 
ers). Each such conduit interfaces to a different type of 
physical data repository and provides a canonical, XML- 
based data access layer to be used by the next SHIAL ar- 
chitectuml level, the Semantic Homogenization Layer 
499 
Authorized licensed use limited to: CURTIN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on March 16,2010 at 00:49:12 EDT from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
(SHL). The SHL provides a semantic mapping of the intra- 
organizational meta-data to standardized terminologies 
provided by HL7 domain ontologies [9]. This complex 
function is broken down in four sub-functions: 
Information units exchanged between SHIAL and the 
EHRs network are called documents in OUT terminol- 
ogy (which adopts the HL7 Clinical Document (CD) 
Architecture. The Document-Level Ontology Mapping 
provides a coarse-grained association between docu- 
ment types in the CDA and information units to be ex- 
changed with the SHIAL to be deployed in a particular 
organization. Moreover, it defmes how to generate 
and process the contextual meta-data that has to be as- 
sociated with all CDA documents (such as confidenti- 
ality, author, subject etc.). 
The Section-Level Ontology Mapping provides a 
more f i e - p i n e d  association between different se- 
mantic sections in each document type with section- 
types defined in the HL7 CD architecture. 
The Entry-Level Ontology Mapping derives the se- 
mantics of the ha-orgauizational metadata €rom in- 
formation types defined in the HL7 Reference Infor- 
mation Model (RIM). 
The Domain-Level Ontology Mapping provides a 
further detailed association between entries in docu- 
ment sections and organizational metadata, based on 
a domain-specific R-MIM. (HL7 standard [9] defines 
an R-MIM as an “Information structure that represents 
the requirements for a set of messages. A constrained 
subset of the RIM which may contain additional 
classes that are cloned from RIM classes”. 
On the top of the SHIAL architecture stack is the Secure 
Access Layer (SAL), which implements advanced security 
senices and Web-service connectivity. Of particular im- 
portance is the Contextual Audit-Trail Logger, a compo- 
nent that scans the contextual metadata of all in- and out- 
going documents and logs consistent audit trails using the 
ATM. The Contextual Key Manager securely hosts a key- 
chain of keys for accessing information in documents, de- 
pending on the parameters of the individual usage context 
(such as role of the organization, purpose of use, identity of 
person, etc.). The Trust Certificate Manager holds a set of 
electrolllc trust certificates issued by the ATM. The top two 
components in the S A L  are responsible for providing stan- 
dards compliant Web service interface (SOAPIWS- 
Security) for document exchange, and for registering the 
SHIAL information services with EHRS registries. 
v. AUTEIORIZAT~ON AND ACCESS M A C E R  (AAM) AND 
N I V l D U A L  CONSENT MANAGER UCM) 
The A A M ’ s  main function is  to answer the question 
“Dots prospective user X have the right to perform func- 
tion Y on data set 2.” X might be an individual or a sys- 
tem. Y might be, for example, display, print, copy, email, 
or import into a clinical system. 2 is often characterized as 
being about a person and of a particular information type. 
The ICM’s main purpose is to provide the systematic capa- 
bility for individuals to author and record their preferences 
(policies, rules) for the dissemination and use of their pri- 
vate health information (medical patient records), and then 
to serve that information to the AAM. The two compo- 
nents work together to effect individual privacy preferences 
in practice at the point of use of patient health records. 
They must be able to handle cases where the records are in 
a structured database or in document form (a human- 
readable file such as a word processor file) independent of 
any identified database or document repository. C A ”  
recently supported the Policy and Peer Permission (PPP) 
system project invoIving RightsMarket: 
(http://m.rightsmarket.com), University of Calgary 
Telehealth (http://www.fp.ucalgary.cdtelehealtW), and the 
Ottawa Heart Institute. The AAM to a large extent, and 
ICM to a significant extent, are derived from the deliver- 
ables of that successful project and integrated with the 
DMMP component. 
VI. APPLICATIONS 
The project is focused on a specific EHR solution, in the 
context of a decision support system (DSS) for Glaucoma 
Progression Monitoring, Fig. 6 [IO]. The application do- 
main is the area of health science applications, namely the 
research of using web-services in assisting doctors for the 
investigation of the progression process along a patient’s 
lifetime in the case o f  glaucoma monitoring and treatment. 
Figure 6: Solution Domain Arcbimhm 
The DSS will support the doctors in the diagnostic, 
treatment and supervision processes of the evolution of a 
glaucoma patient based on the exploration of all data perti- 
nent to the case and on the scientific data contained in vari- 
ous professional databases [12]. The DSS consists of an 
EducationtConsultation System [l 11 to provide evidence- 
based guidelines of care to clinicians, and a Consensus 
Analyzer [13] to constantly update and refine these guide- 
lines based on patient encounters and expert opinions. Us- 
ers can access the DSS directly via a Web-based user inter- 
face, or indirectly by using their clinical EHR system, 
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which integrates with the DSS. The DSS is also integrated 
with other EHR hfiastructure services, such a s  patient and 
provider registries. In addition to structured data, the Glau- 
coma monitoring system uses high-resolution diagnostic 
imaging supported by CA*net 4, ORION, NETERAnet etc. 
The medical specialist interacts in real-time with the vari- 
ous data collected, unified, and explored through the 
DMMP and provided to the DSS components. With respect 
to the HL7 e-Health communication standard, we are 
working on the creation of ao R-MIM for Glaucoma diag- 
nosis and guidelines, based on our previous work on the 
development of e-Health ontologies [SI. 
W. CONCLUSIONS 
(1) a reference model for secure web-sewices as a refme- 
ment of Infoway’s EHR Blueprint with respect to as- 
pects of security, 
(2) specification and design of an integrated environment 
and tools for supporting the activity of the medical 
specialist while curing patients with glaucoma 
(3) implementation of these components and their inte- 
gration with components developed by other EHR ini- 
tiatives (e.g., patient and provider registry), and 
(4) their evaluation with a specific net-centric pilot appli- 
cation: glaucoma progression monitoring. 
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